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Abstract in English 
For the design of an immigration policy, in terms of the number and skills of the entrants and 
their effect on the host country, it is important to realize that the kind of welfare state matters. 
This study confronts three possible labour migration regimes - a temporary, an open and a 
selective regime - with two possible welfare state settings -  a highly redistributive and a 
hardly redistributive welfare state. By comparing the likely outcomes between the different 
regimes, and by taking possible effects on the self-selection of immigrants into account, the 
study draws the following conclusions. First, both labour migration policy and the welfare state 
matter for the skill composition of labour migrants. Second, to be attractive for high-skilled 
labour migrants a highly distributive welfare state needs to undo its discouraging effect on these 
migrants. Third, a highly redistributive welfare state is attractive for low-skilled labour 
migrants. Because these migrants may become costly for such a welfare state once they manage 
to stay permanently, one should be careful with the introduction of temporary migration policies 
for the low-skilled. 
 
Key words: International migration, public policy, redistribution 
JEL code: D31, F22, J18, J61  
Abstract in Dutch 
De mate van inkomensherverdeling binnen een welvaartsstaat is belangrijk bij de vormgeving 
van het beleid voor arbeidsmigratie. Deze studie confronteert drie mogelijke vormen van beleid 
- een tijdelijk, een open en een selectief arbeidsmigratiebeleid - met twee prototypen 
welvaartsstaat - één met veel en één met weinig herverdeling. Door de waarschijnlijke 
uitkomsten van de verschillende mogelijke combinaties van beleid voor arbeidsmigratie en de 
welvaartsstaat met elkaar te vergelijken, en daarbij de effecten op de zelfselectie van de 
migranten mee te nemen, komt de studie tot de volgende conclusies. Ten eerste, zowel het 
migratiebeleid als de welvaartsstaat heeft invloed op de samenstelling naar opleidingsniveau 
van de arbeidsmigranten. Ten tweede, om aantrekkelijk te zijn voor hooggeschoolde 
arbeidsmigranten dient een welvaartsstaat met veel herverdeling een extra inspanning te 
leveren. Tot slot is een dergelijke welvaartsstaat aantrekkelijk voor laaggeschoolde 
arbeidsmigranten. Vanwege de mogelijke kosten voor deze welvaartsstaat, die ontstaan als deze 
migranten erin slagen permanent in Nederland te blijven, dient voorzichtig te worden omgegaan 
met tijdelijke arbeidsmigratie van laaggeschoolden. 
 
Steekwoorden: arbeidsmigratie, welvaartsstaat, herverdeling  
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Preface 
One of the tasks of CPB is to explore future economic developments and the consequences of 
strategic choices in social and economic policy. To inform policy makers and the general public 
CPB-studies like Four Futures of Europe and Four Futures for the Netherlands describe 
different possible futures, while Reinventing the Welfare State sketches alternative choices in 
welfare state design. This study is a follow-up of the latter study in the sense that it explores the 
interaction between types of welfare states and immigration policies.  
 
The results of the study are used to discuss two recent Dutch policy proposals. Although the 
study was not initiated to evaluate these policy proposals explicitly, the question on the impact 
of the proposals arises naturally. Note however that the scope of the exercise is limited as we 
address the interaction between immigration policy and welfare state design, and we do not 
address, for example, the legal aspects and practical issues on the implementation of policies.  
 
This report has been written by Victory Chorny, Rob Euwals and Kees Folmer. Victoria Chorny 
contributed to the study during the time she was working as a Young Professional at CPB. Rob 
Euwals and Kees Folmer are senior researchers at CPB, and they mainly contributed to the 
conceptual framework used in the study, as well as the policy conclusions. Besides the valuable 
feedback of many CPB colleagues, the study benefited from comments of Henk Fijn van Draat 
(Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands), Bart van Riel (Social and Economic Council 
of the Netherlands), Hans Roodenburg (former CPB), Arjen Taselaar (Dutch Ministry of 
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Summary 
Many countries, including the Netherlands, are currently reconsidering their immigration 
policy. For the design of an effective policy, in terms of the number and skills of the entrants 
and their effect on the host country, it is important to realize that the welfare state matters as 
well. Immigration policy and welfare state design affect each other, and jointly they determine 
the impact of immigration on the host country.  
 
This study confronts different immigration regimes with different welfare state settings to 
illustrate the interaction between the two types of policies. The assessment of the economic 
outcomes is based on literature reviews on (1) the impact of immigration policy and the welfare 
state on the selection of immigrants, and (2) the impact of immigration on the host country’s 
economy. By comparing the likely outcomes between the different regimes, and by taking 
possible effects on the selection of immigrants into account, the study will draw conclusions on 
opportunities and risks of different options for immigration policy. 
 
This study considers three possible immigration regimes and two possible welfare state settings. 
For immigration policy, we consider a TEMPORARY POLICY in which a number of low-skilled 
labour migrants are allowed to enter the country on a temporary basis, an OPEN POLICY in which 
there are almost no restrictions leading to many low-skilled labour migrants, and a SELECTIVE 
POLICY in which only high-skilled labour migrants are allowed to enter the country. For the 
welfare state, we consider a RESIDUAL WELFARE STATE, with low taxes and low benefit levels, 
and a UNIVERSAL WELFARE STATE, with high taxes and high benefit levels. For the interpretation 
of the outcomes it is important to notice that there is a difference between the two dimensions: 
while the options for the welfare state are shaped along the equity-efficiency trade off and 
optimality depends on social preferences, the options for migration policy are not shaped along 
a dimension that represents a basic trade off in social preferences. Therefore one immigration 
regime may - in theory - dominate another regime in terms of economic outcomes. As however 
all policy options will have winners and losers among the natives, there will not exist a regime 
in which all natives are better off than in all other regimes. So, optimality still depends on social 
preferences. 
 
By comparing the outcomes between different immigration regimes and different welfare state 
settings, we are able to draw the following conclusions: 
 
A first conclusion is that immigration policy matters. Experiences of other countries show that a 
selective immigration policy may lead to another skill composition of the group of labour 
migrants. The welfare state however co-determines the scope of immigration policy, as we will 
argue below.   10 
Second, welfare state arrangements related to income redistribution and wage inequality matter. 
Generous welfare states with highly redistribute taxes and a relatively equal wage distribution 
discourage high-skilled and encourage low-skilled labour migrants to apply for a work permit. 
This limits the scope of immigration policy: an active immigration policy for the high-skilled 
needs to undo a possible discouraging effect of a generous welfare state to be successful. 
 
Third, welfare state arrangements related to welfare benefits matter as well, but most likely to a 
lesser extent. Countries with high benefit levels attract more (low-skilled) immigrants - the 
welfare magnet hypothesis - but empirical evidence shows that the effect is likely to be small. 
 
Fourth, the self-selection of immigrants, caused by their rational economic behaviour, is a curse 
for the welfare state. Labour migrants select countries which give them the highest pay-off. 
High-skilled labour migrants are likely to choose for countries with low taxes and an unequal 
wage distribution. These countries gain relatively little from immigration as the gain largely 
goes to the immigrants themselves. On the other hand, countries with a highly redistributive 
welfare state would like to attract high-skilled labour to redistribute from. They face however 
difficulties in attracting such migrants. This illustrates the simultaneity in the decision on 
immigration policy and welfare state design: a choice for a redistributive welfare state almost 
automatically limits the scope of a selective immigration policy. 
 
Fifth, the risks associated with temporary immigration policies should be taken seriously. 
Potentially, such a policies yield a positive impact on the public finances. The temporary aspect 
is however crucial: if it is not enforced properly the policy may end up in being an open 
immigration policy. Such an outcome is the worst of the three immigration regimes as it may 
put the welfare state under pressure. So unless proven to be effective, for example in a small 
scale experiment, it is not advisable to introduce such a policy. 
 
The conclusions are confronted with a recent proposal of the Dutch government and the 
alternative proposal of the Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands. The government 
proposal explicitly recognizes the differences in economic potential between migrants by 
defining different categories of labour migrants. The strength of the proposal is that it is clear 
and transparent with respect to the rights and obligations of the immigrants and employers. The 
council emphasizes the motives for migration, and in particular emphasizes the need for a more 
clearly defined category for labour migration. The proposal is less clear on the rights and 
obligations of the immigrants, but it is clearer on which categories are relevant for labour 
migrants and employers. 
   11 
1  Introduction 
Since the end of the 1990s, many European countries realize that they need to reconsider the 
design of their immigration policies. One reason is that in effect they have become immigration 
countries, while another is that they want to become more competitive on the worldwide labour 
market for high-skilled workers. The Dutch government proposed a new design of immigration 
policy in June 2006, while the European Commission promotes immigration as a potential tool 
to meet the Lisbon goals. Migration within the union may contribute to the welfare of EU 
countries as free labour migration allows for an optimal allocation of labour, while immigration 
from outside the union may contribute to the EU economy as on average immigrants are young 
and well-motivated to work. Immigration may lead, however, to less favourable outcomes for 
certain groups of native workers. Moreover, immigration may put pressure on redistribution and 
social insurances as well. Immigration and welfare state policy therefore interact with each 
other. The goal of this study is to exploit this particular interaction. 
 
Immigration policies aim to affect the transit of persons across borders, and especially of those 
that intend to work or to remain within the host country. This includes, for example, labour 
migration, family reunification, family formation and asylum. In this study, we investigate the 
impact of immigration policy on the labour market and the welfare state. We focus on 
immigration policies that aim at goals in terms of employment and welfare state sustainability. 
We therefore investigate the impact of labour migration, whereby we consider family migration 
as well since labour migrants may have or may form families. We do not emphasize asylum 
immigration as in principle it is granted on the basis of humanitarian grounds. 
 
Welfare states are designed such that they comply with social preferences on redistribution and 
social insurance. In public discussions on the interaction between welfare state design and 
immigration policy it is often emphasized that immigration impacts the sustainability of the 
welfare state. A fact that is often not taken into account is that the welfare state itself may 
impact the number and the skills of immigrants. The interaction between immigration policy 
and welfare state design therefore goes into both directions; while immigration policy affects 
the welfare state, welfare state design also affects the feasibility of goals in immigration policy.  
 
In this study, we design prototypes of immigration and welfare state policies. We assess the 
economic impact of different immigration regimes in different welfare states in a qualitative 
fashion. We do this on the basis of theory and empirical evidence on immigration. The design 
of the prototypes will be as follows: the selective effect of immigration policy will be described 
in two dimensions: one dimension for the skills of immigrants, and one dimension for the 
length of stay. Both dimensions represent important policy trade offs. We will explore the 
impact of the different immigration regimes, i.e. by combining the two dimensions, on the   12 
labour market and public finances in two types of welfare states. These welfare states are a 
residual welfare state (i.e. with low taxes and low benefit levels) and a universal welfare state 
(i.e. with high taxes and high benefit levels). The welfare states may be interpreted as potential 
institutional settings in the Netherlands in the future, but we do not quantify the parameters of 
the institutional settings like in De Mooij (2006).  
 
The lessons from stylized framework will be used to discuss the recent Dutch policy proposals. 
Although the study was not initiated to evaluate policy proposals explicitly, it seems rather 
obvious to relate the conclusions to the recent proposal of the government (Dutch Ministry of 
Justice, 2006) and the alternative proposal of the Social and Economic Council of the 
Netherlands (SER, 2007). This exercise should be interpreted as a partial evaluation as only we 
discuss the interaction of immigration policy with the welfare state. 
 
The focus on the interaction between immigration and the welfare state implies that we abstract 
from several aspects of immigration policy. We clearly do not deny the importance of these 
aspects, but they are simply beyond the scope of this study. First, we abstract from illegal 
immigration. Although this is an important issue, the multidisciplinary character of illegal 
immigration is obviously difficult to implement in a stylized economic approach. Second, we 
abstract from endogenous growth. High-skilled immigration may boost the growth of the 
economy due to the contribution of the immigrants to research and development. Although 
many economists are convinced of such an impact, empirical evidence on the size of this effect 
is still scarce. Third, we abstract from the role that labour migration may play in solving 
shortages on labour market in the short run. In this sense, this study may underestimate the 
gains from migration as the short term gains should be added to the long term impact on the 
welfare state. Fourth, and related to the previous point, we abstract from issues on the 
implementation of immigration policy. Within our stylized approach, we will not be able to 
analyse the consequences of different policies like demand-driven systems with work permits 
and supply-driven systems with selection on the basis of points. Finally, we abstract from 
political economy effects. Immigration may lead to changes in the political preferences of 
natives, and therefore to changes in the welfare state. We consider our analysis as an input of 
the political process. We do not explore the possible impact on the process itself. 
 
The remainder of the document is organised as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the impact of 
immigration and welfare state policy on the number and the skills of immigrants. Chapter 3 
analyzes the impact of immigration on the labour market and welfare state. Chapter 4 presents 
the analytical framework of our scenario approach, while chapter 5 presents the labour market 
and welfare state outcomes of the different scenarios in a qualitative fashion. Finally, chapter 6 
discusses two recent Dutch policy proposals.   13 
2  Selection of immigrants: theory and empirical evidence 
Individual circumstances like family ties and economic and political incentives are determinants 
of the migration decision. These determinants have a significant impact on the quantity, skill 
composition and direction of migration flows. The incentives are likely to lead to immigrant 
selection. Immigrants are neither a random sample of the population of a source country, nor a 
random sample of the population of a host country. It is instrumental to study immigrant 
selection since it has an effect on the success of immigrants in the host country, and therefore 
on the gains and losses they bring to the native population.  
 
Several aspects of immigration and welfare state policy cause immigrant selection. We 
distinguish explicit selection implemented by the host country and self-selection. First, 
immigration policy may act as a barrier to migration leading to explicit selection. Criteria 
specified in immigration policies allow only some individuals to immigrate into a country. 
Second, individuals who decide to migrate have characteristics which make migration 
profitable, leading to self-selection in a positive sense. Third, immigration policy may affect 
immigrant selection indirectly as it may change incentives to migrate. For example, selective 
immigration policies with an option of long-term or permanent residence may give an 
advantage on the competitive labour market for talents. Fourth, welfare state policy may affect 
immigrant selection since taxes, social insurances, welfare, and the provision of public goods 
affect the return to immigration, potentially leading to self-selection in a negative sense. All 
aspects are important in the explanation of the number and the skills of immigrants.  
 
In this chapter, we first present a theoretical review on the selection of immigrants. The theories 
allow us to explain the skill composition of immigration flows. Next, we analyze the impact of 
the two factors central in our analytical part - immigration policy and welfare state policy - on 
immigrant selection.  
2.1  Human capital and network effects 
This section discusses two important approaches to immigrant selection. First, the human 
capital approach explains the migration decision in terms of the return to human capital. 
Depending on the assumptions made on migration costs, the human capital approach predicts 
that immigrants are positively self-selected from the population of the host country. However, 
immigrants from developing countries may be negatively self-selected compared to the 
population of a developed host country. Second, the network approach claims that immigrants 
are likely to settle in a location where other immigrants from the same source country already 
reside. Several authors in the literature claim that network effects are so strong that they 
dominate all other determinants of the migration decision.   14 
Human capital 
Individuals base their decision to migrate largely on the expected net return from migration. 
The expected return depends on aspects like the probability to find a job, the wage, and the 
costs of migration. Within the human capital model, these factors mainly depend on the skills of 
the migrants. Accordingly, immigrant self-selection occurs because individuals migrate when 
the net return to their human capital is higher in the host country than in the source country: the 
return to human capital is the key decision variable. The human capital approach as introduced 
by Sjaastad (1962) and developed further by Chiswick (2000), has an important role for 
migration costs. It is based on the assumptions that there are direct and fixed out-of-pocket 
migration costs, that migration costs decrease with ability (because ability enhances efficiency 
in migration) and that opportunity costs of migration (foregone earnings) increase with ability. 
The model predicts that positive selection occurs when out-of-pocket migration costs are large 
or when higher skills and education levels lead to more efficient information collection. Thus, 
the human capital model predicts that migrants will be on average young and high-skilled, and 
Chiswick (2000) concludes that immigrants are positively self-selected. 
 
In contrast to the previous authors, Borjas (1987) develops a negative self-selection hypothesis. 
He uses an alternative specification of the human capital model and focuses on the ratio of the 
wages in the host and in the source country. The main difference with the Sjaastad model is that 
the migration costs are a constant proportion of income, and that ability has no effect on 
efficiency in migration. As a result, the migration decision is based on the return to migration in 
terms of wages. Borjas (1987) predicts that immigrants from developing countries are likely to 
be negatively self-selected for two reasons. First, the low-skilled have a large incentive to 
migrate as developed countries often have smaller wage dispersions than developing countries. 
Secondly, many of the high-skilled may have a small incentive to migrate as often their skills 
are hardly transferable to developed countries. Differences in culture, education and economic 
systems are often substantial, and high skilled immigrants in developed countries often need to 
accept jobs for which they are overqualified.  
 
The dispute between the believers of the positive and negative self-selection theory has not 
ended. Both theories are likely to contain some relevant aspects as both the US and Europe 
receive large numbers of both high- and low-skilled immigrants. 
Network effects 
The network approach predicts that individuals are more likely to migrate to host countries that 
have already large immigrant communities from the same source country. The approach extents 
the notion of migration costs in the human capital framework (Massey et al., 1993, Bauer and 
Zimmermann, 1999a). The first immigrant faces high migration costs because of lack of 
information. However, the immigrant’s  relatives and friends will face lower migration costs   15 
since they will be more informed. This explanation can be analogically extended not only to 
relatives and friends, but also to fellow citizens from the same source country. In other words, 
the network approach states that migration costs decrease with the amount of migrants in the 
host country.  
Empirical evidence 
Most of the empirical studies on human capital and network effects will be discussed in the next 
sections as these effects play an important role in the impact of immigration and welfare state 
policy on immigration. But we first discuss a few studies that are particularly directed towards 
human capital and network effects. 
 
Several studies find that the propensity to migrate increases with education and skill level, 
which supports the human capital theory according to Sjaastad and Chiswick. We discuss two 
of these studies. First, Chiquiar and Hanson (2002) investigate selection among Mexican 
immigrants in the US. They find, on the one hand, that Mexican immigrants are on average 
more educated than residents of Mexico, and on the other hand that they are much less educated 
than US natives. Chiquiar and Hanson appeal to heterogeneity in migration costs in order to 
explain their findings. Second, Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2004) use data on immigrant intentions 
in 23 countries including the traditional immigration countries and large European countries. 
They find that immigration is mostly positively self-selected. Differences in the wage 
distribution between countries may reduce the positive selection, but according to their study it 
will not result in negative selection.  
 
Almost all studies on network effects find clear evidence that a large amount of immigrants in a 
country increases the probability of migration of individuals from the same source country. 
Examples of such studies are Mckenzie and Rapoport (2004) for Mexican immigrants in the 
US, Rotte and Vogler (1998) for African and Asian immigrants in Germany, and Pedersen et al. 
(2004) for a study of migration flows into 27 OECD countries. 
2.2  Immigration policy 
Immigration policy has an effect on immigrant selection in several ways, and we discuss two of 
them. First, immigration policy affects selection directly by imposing immigration criteria. 
Second, it affects selection indirectly because immigration policy may also affect the incentives 
to migrate. This may lead to self-selection. In this section, we discuss immigration policy in 
light of the self-selection theories. We also review the empirical evidence on immigration 
policy and selection.   16 
Theory 
The human capital approach states that the return to human capital in the home and the host 
country, together with the costs of migration, are important for the incentive to migrate. 
Immigration policy affects immigration costs significantly because it obliges immigrants to 
fulfil certain requirements. In addition, it may also affect the return to immigration by imposing 
restrictions on migrants once in the country. Finally, immigration policy affects selection 
directly by imposing requirements on entry. We illustrate these effects by discussing evidence 
from countries with different immigration policies.  
 
Restrictive and bureaucratic migration policies increase the costs of immigration. Immigrants to 
countries with such policies are likely to be high-skilled since they are able to overcome the 
costs of migration costs. However, considering globalization and the increasing competition for 
international talent, restrictive policies may also discourage high-skilled immigrants if there are 
other attractive host countries with less cumbersome policies.  
 
Selective migration policies that aim at attracting migrants with certain characteristics and 
labour market skills select individuals with economic motives to migrate. Such immigrants are 
more likely to be employed and to have higher earnings than other immigrants. Thus, economic 
migrants are generally more favourably selected than migrants with other motives to migrate. 
 
In contrast to traditional migration countries like the Australia and Canada, some countries 
(especially in Europe) prefer temporary immigration policies. Such policies may discourage 
immigration since the benefits may not outweigh the costs. In addition, immigrants usually have 
to invest in country-specific human capital such as language and culture in order to successfully 
adjust in the new situation. Thus, temporary policies may also reduce the incentives of high-
skilled individuals to migrate since the return from investing in country-specific human capital 
is low for temporary immigrants (Dustmann, 1993). Yet, if human capital is transferable – as is 
the case for much high-tech knowledge - temporary policies may not be an obstacle for 
migration. (Boeri et al., 2002). In addition, high-skilled immigrants are more likely to accept 
temporary migration if the host country-specific human capital also yields a return in the home 
country (Dustmann, 1999). 
Empirical evidence 
The empirical literature on selective immigration policies can be divided into two groups: some 
studies compare labour market characteristics of immigrants in countries with different 
immigration policies, while other studies compare characteristics of immigrants entering a host 
country through different admission channels.  
   17 
Several studies compare immigrants in the United States - whose immigration policy focuses on 
family ties - with immigrants in Canada or Australia - where immigration policies are based on 
economic criteria. The main findings are that immigrants in Canada and Australia are on 
average more skilled and exhibit a smaller earnings differential with natives than immigrants in 
the US. However, when the immigrants in each country are divided into groups according to 
their source country, and each group is compared with its counterpart in the other countries, 
immigrants in the US are not found to be on average less educated than their counterparts in 
Canada (Duleep and Regets, 1992) or Australia (Antecol et al. (2001)). The Canadian and 
Australian immigration policies, thus, seem successful not because they select immigrants 
positively from the whole world, but because they select immigrants from certain source 
countries. Therefore, countries with selective immigration policies manage to control the 
national origin mix of their immigrants by choosing immigrants from countries where the 
average citizen is relatively educated and high-skilled.  
 
Immigrants admitted through economic channels are generally found to be more skilled and 
earn higher wages than immigrants admitted through other channels. For the US, Jasso and 
Rosenzweig (1995) and Duleep and Regets (1996) find that differences between the groups 
become smaller with the duration of residence. For Canada, Wright and Maxim (1993) 
conclude that immigrants entering through the economic channel have a smaller earnings 
differential with natives than immigrants admitted through the family channel. Constant and 
Zimmermann (2005) conduct a comparative study of Germany and Denmark and find that 
immigrants entering through the asylum and family channel are more likely to be unemployed 
and to earn less than economic migrants.  
 
In conclusion, immigration policies affect selection directly by restricting immigration and 
indirectly by affecting migration incentives. Theory and empirical evidence suggest that 
policies based on economic criteria tend to select migrants more positively. The positive 
selection however mostly results from allowing immigrants from particular countries to enter 
the country. The next section discusses another policy factor that may affect immigrant 
selection, namely, the welfare state. 
2.3  Welfare state policy 
The design of the welfare state may affect immigrant self-selection in different ways. First, 
welfare benefits and public good provision raise expected income flows and offer an insurance 
against risks. Second, redistribution affects the expected net income flow as well. So the return 
from migration is likely to be affected by the welfare state since immigrants differ in their 
vulnerability to risks and their utilization of public goods. This section argues that the above   18 
factors are related to skill levels of immigrants, and consequently the skill composition of 
immigrants may be affected by the welfare state.  
Theory 
The discussion on the impact of the welfare state on immigration is heavily dominated by the 
so-called welfare magnet hypothesis (Borjas, 1999). This hypothesis predicts the location 
choice of immigrants, differentiated by skill level. More recently, some theories also provide 
predictions for individual traits like risk aversion.  
 
The welfare magnet hypothesis states that countries with more generous welfare systems attract 
more immigrants than less generous but otherwise similar countries. This hypothesis also 
predicts that countries with generous welfare states will attract more low-skilled immigrants. 
The latter results strongly relate to the negative self-selection theory of Borjas (1987), which is 
based on differences in wage distributions between countries.  
 
Applying the welfare magnet hypothesis to the US, Borjas (1999) claims that immigrants locate 
themselves in US states that offer high welfare benefits. The argument is that once immigrants 
have incurred the fixed costs of migration to the US, the costs of choosing a particular state are 
marginal. Consequently, immigrants that have a large probability to become in need of welfare 
benefits will choose for states that offer high benefits. So in particular low-skilled immigrants 
are likely to choose for such states, as they are more likely to become unemployed. Applying 
the hypothesis to Europe, Boeri et al. (2002) claim that immigrants with skills below a certain 
threshold will choose for EU countries with a generous welfare state.  
 
The welfare state may lead to self-selection in terms of skills, but it may lead to self-selection in 
terms of other individual traits as well. Unemployment and disability benefits reduce the labour 
market risks of workers, and therefore of immigrant workers as well. Risk averse immigrants 
are likely to value unemployment and welfare benefits highly, which influences their choice of 
location (Heitmueller, 2005). Thus, generous welfare states may on average attract immigrants 
with a higher degree of risk aversion.  
Empirical evidence 
The empirical evidence on the impact of the welfare state is rather mixed. Studies that also take 
the network effect into account generally find that networks are so important that they dominate 
all other effects. 
 
Studies like Borjas and Hilton (1996), Borjas (1999) and Boeri et al. (2002) do find that 
generous welfare states attract more immigrants. First, Borjas and Hilton (1996) conclude that 
new immigrants to the US are likely to receive similar types of benefits as previous immigrants   19 
from the same origin country. A possible explanation is the existence of ethnic networks that 
transfer information about welfare benefits to potential immigrants in the origin country. The 
availability of information about welfare benefits may influence migration decisions of 
individuals. In particular, unskilled individuals may be more likely to migrate if they have better 
information about the availability and accessibility of welfare benefits. Secondly, Borjas (1999) 
finds that immigrant welfare recipients are more likely to be clustered in states with higher 
welfare levels than immigrants who do not receive welfare. Finally, Boeri et al. (2002) show 
that welfare benefits in the EU countries distort the skill composition of migrants (attracting 
relatively low-skilled migrants). Although the authors indicate overall small effects, they 
suggest that some of the generous countries (like Denmark and the Netherlands) attract 
immigrants that are likely to become dependent on welfare and other social security benefits. 
 
Contrary to the previous studies, Zavodny (1999), Pedersen et al. (2004) and Kaushal (2005) do 
not find evidence in favour of the welfare magnet hypothesis. Zavodny (1999) states that the 
primary factor explaining the location decisions of new immigrants in the US is the location of 
other (previous) immigrants. In fact, immigrants seem to respond more to interstate differences 
in migrant population than to interstate differences welfare benefits. In a study on migration 
flows into the OECD countries, Pedersen et al. (2004) conclude that the negative impact of a 
high tax pressure on immigration is stronger for immigration flows from low income countries 
than from higher income countries. The authors argue that more generous welfare states may 
pursue more restrictive immigration policies. Thus, generous welfare states may serve more as a 
barrier rather than a magnet to immigrants. Furthermore, they also indicate that network effects 
and immigration policies are more important than the generosity of the welfare state. Finally, 
Kaushal (2005) allocates immigrant women to different groups according to their economic risk 
of becoming welfare dependent. She investigates whether more vulnerable groups tend to settle 
in US states with generous welfare benefits. Her conclusion is that the most vulnerable group is 
not more attracted to states with higher welfare levels. In line with studies mentioned above, the 
author suggests that location decisions of immigrants are guided by network effects rather than 
welfare benefits. 
2.4  Conclusions 
Immigration policy and welfare state policy affect the number and the skills of immigrants. This 
is important as it may affect the impact that immigrants have on the host country. The literature 
provides an intense discussion on whether immigrants are positively or negatively self-selected. 
That is, are immigrants more educated or less educated than the average resident in the source 
and/or host country? On the basis of the literature, we draw the following conclusions. 
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Immigration policy clearly affects the number and the skills of immigrants. Explicit selection 
has a direct impact as such a policy simply selects immigrants on the basis of education and 
skills. Immigration policy may also have an indirect impact as it may induce self-selection by 
affecting the return to migration. First, countries with selective policies succeed in attracting 
more skilled immigrants than countries with alternative policies. The success of selective 
policies is the not the result of attracting the more skilled immigrants from a particular country, 
but it is the result of attracting immigrants from more developed countries (which are on 
average more skilled than immigrants from less-developed countries). Second, temporary 
migration policies may induce negative self-selection. Temporary policies reduce the returns 
from investments in human capital, leading to the fact that high-skilled immigrants and 
immigrants with the ability to acquire country-specific human capital choose for countries in 
which the period of stay is longer (which they need to recover the costs of their investments). 
 
Welfare state arrangements like income redistribution and inequality in the wage distribution 
are likely to be important. Extensive welfare states with highly redistribute taxes and a 
relatively equal wage distribution discourage high-skilled and encourage low-skilled labour 
migrants to apply for a work permit. Immigration data clearly shows there is substantial 
immigration from low-wage countries, while several studies find substantial low-skilled 
immigration from countries with an unequal income distribution. Wages and incomes, both in 
net terms, are therefore clearly important determinants of migration flows.  
 
Welfare state arrangements related to welfare benefits are important as well, but nevertheless 
the size of their impact is likely to be small. In theory social security and welfare benefits affect 
the expected income in the host country, and hence affect the incentives to migrate. Generous 
welfare states may attract more immigrants than less generous welfare states, and these 
immigrants will be relatively low-skilled. Some studies do find evidence in favour of the so-
called welfare magnet hypothesis, but nevertheless the size and importance of the impact is not 
likely to be large. 
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3  Impact of immigration: theory and empirical evidence 
Immigration has far reaching consequences for the host country’s economy. Immigrants 
contribute to production by working, pay taxes and social security contributions, potentially 
draw from the welfare system, send their children to schools and consume. In this chapter, we 
focus on the impact of immigration on the host country’s labour market and public finances. 
First, we discuss the theoretical impact of immigration on wages and unemployment. Next, we 
review the empirical literature of the impact of immigration on the labour market. Finally, we 
present a theoretical and empirical overview on the impact of immigration on public finances.  
3.1  Labour market 
The literature on the impact of immigration on the labour market is well-developed. In the short 
run, immigration may have a negative impact on the labour market position of natives who have 
to compete with immigrants. In the long run, however, the impact on the labour market may be 
small due to different adjustment processes. The adjustment of the host economy to 
immigration depends on labour market flexibility, output mix flexibility and factor mobility. 
We begin by reviewing the theory of the immigration impact on wages and unemployment. 
Subsequently, we present different adjustment mechanisms that may dampen the impact on 
wages and unemployment. We conclude with an overview of the empirical evidence on the 
impact of immigration. 
Theory 
An immigration shock alters the capital labour ratio of a host country by increasing the 
endowment of labour. The resulting adjustment of the host country’s economy depends on the 
labour market flexibility. When wages are flexible, the adjustment occurs only through wages, 
while when wages are rigid, adjustment occurs through the level of employment as well. In 
addition, we investigate how the skill composition of immigrants affects the outcome on the 
labour market. 
 
Impact on wages 
In the short-run, when capital is relatively inelastic, immigrants decrease the earnings of the 
production factors to which they are substitutes (labour) and increase the earnings of the 
production factors to which they are complements (capital). As a result, native workers lose 
while native capital owners gain. The net benefit to the economy from immigration, called 
immigration surplus, is the gain of capital owners minus the loss of native workers (because of 
lower wages). The more wages fall as a result of immigration, the larger is the immigration 
surplus. This simple neoclassical theory of immigration illustrates an important trade-off: 
immigration increases total output of a host country, but the gains are not distributed equally   22 
over the population of the host country. The more wages decrease, the larger is the immigration 
surplus but the larger is also the redistribution of income from workers to capital owners. 
 
The impact of immigration on the labour market depends on the skills of immigrants. Once 
more, immigrants will decrease the wages of the workers to which they are substitutes. Skilled 
(unskilled) immigrants will cause the wages of skilled (unskilled) workers to decrease, thus 
resulting in a positive immigration surplus. However, immigrants will also increase wages of 
workers to which they are complements. Thus, the larger the complementarity between 
immigrants and natives is, the larger is the immigration surplus. Accordingly, the host economy 
benefits most when the skills of immigrants are different from the skills of the natives.  
 
Impact on unemployment 
Labour market institutions may create wage rigidities, which in turn may affect the impact of 
immigration on the labour market. For example, collective bargaining between unions and 
employer organizations may prevent wages from decreasing below a certain level, and 
minimum wages certainly do. Thus, when facing an immigration shock, a rigid economy may 
adjust through higher unemployment rather than lower wages. This may be particularly relevant 
for the lower end of the labour market, where wage rigidities may be more important than at the 
upper end. Therefore, adjustment through employment may be particularly relevant when 
immigrants are relatively unskilled. 
 
The negative impact of immigration on the employment of natives may be more pronounced in 
generous welfare states since they are much more characterised by rigid labour markets, 
extensive unemployment insurance and restrictive labour market institutions. Dustmann and 
Glitz (2005) claim that immigration may cause voluntary unemployment among native workers 
whose wages fall. This may be relevant in generous welfare states where reservation wages are 
high because of unemployment and welfare benefits. In addition, restrictive labour institutions 
such as employment protection, high replacement rates and high business entry costs may 
aggravate the impact of immigration on employment even though some of these institutions 
may protect natives from competition in the short-run (Angrist and Kugler, 2003).  
 
Other adjustment processes 
Immigration results in adjustment processes other than changes in wages and unemployment. 
Those processes in turn affect the labour market. In the following, we discuss the ways in which 
the mobility of factors, such as capital and labour, may dampen the impact of immigration on 
wages and unemployment.  
 
In the short-run, an economy responds to changes in the capital/labour ratio through wages. 
However, when capital flows freely wages may not need to change because capital is perfectly   23 
elastic. An immigration shock decreases the capital to labour ratio, thus increasing the return to 
capital. As a result, capital will flow into the economy until the return to capital is equalized 
among the economies in the world. Since eventually wages and the return to capital do not 
change, natives neither gain nor lose from immigration. If, however, the skills of natives and 
immigrants differ immigration-induced capital inflow will not fully adjust for immigration. 
Thus if  immigrants are relatively skilled, skilled wages will still fall and unskilled wages will 
increase, and unskilled immigration will have the opposite effects. 
 
The review so far has focused on an economy which produces one good only. However, a 
multi-sector economy may accommodate changes in labour supply through the output mix 
rather than through wages. Dustmann and Glitz (2005) suggest that the following adjustment 
process may take place. Immigration increases the profits of the sector which uses intensively 
the labour factor type of the immigrants (because of lower wages) and decreases the profits of 
the sector using the other labour type (because of higher wages). As a result, production in the 
sector that experienced lower (higher) wages increases (decreases). The changes in production 
induce shifts in demand for labour so that wages return to their initial level in the long-run. 
Thus, an economy with flexible production mix and openness to trade may adjust to 
immigration through changes in industry structure rather than changes in wage structure.    
 
Finally, in addition to capital and trade adjustments, other factors may adjust the economy in 
the medium and long-run, thus reducing the negative impact of immigration on wages and 
unemployment. First, native workers and firms may move out of immigrant areas. In other 
words, production factors may adjust by reallocating over regions. Second, native workers may 
move out of sectors abundant with immigrants by retraining or enhancing their skills. 
Empirical evidence 
The empirical literature on the impact of immigration on the labour market is well-developed. 
Most of the studies estimate the effect on wages and unemployment while a few attempt to 
measure other consequences such as native responses to immigration and changes in industry 
structure. The main outcome is that the average impact on wages and unemployment is negative 
but small. This contradicts the simple neo-classical theory on this point. Still the small impact 
may be explained by the adjustment mechanisms that dampen the changes in wages and 
unemployment. In this section, we present evidence on this subject in the US and different 
European countries. We also discuss studies that investigate other adjustment mechanisms such 
as factor mobility and industry structure. 
 
Impact on wages and unemployment 
Most empirical studies on the impact of immigration split native and immigrant workers into 
groups according to certain criteria, and measure the correlation between immigration and   24 
labour market outcomes in each group. The first immigration studies split workers according to 
geographical location, thus measuring spatial correlations between wages and unemployment 
and immigration in a specific area. Several authors, including Borjas (1994), Friedberg and 
Hunt (1995), Bauer and Zimmermann (1999b), Dustmann and Glitz (2005) and Longhi et al. 
(2005) review spatial correlation studies. They find an overall negative but small impact of 
immigration on wages and employment in both US and EU, whereby the impact in Europe is 
considered to be slightly more negative than in the US. Theoretically, immigration may affect 
unemployment more negatively in Europe than in the US since the European labour markets are 
less flexible than in the US. For example, Angrist and Kugler (2003) find that immigration 
effects are more negative in countries with less flexible markets, higher replacement rates and 
higher business entry costs. Still, the authors conclude that even in Europe the impact of 
immigration on unemployment is small. 
 
Several explanations have been proposed for the small impact reported by the literature. First, 
spatial correlation studies assume that the direction of causality between immigration and 
labour market outcomes runs one way, from immigrants to labour markets. However, location 
decisions of immigrants are not random and may be affected by labour markets. So, immigrants 
may be attracted to areas that do economically well. Second, production factors such as capital 
and labour may flow freely in an economy until factor prices are equalized across regions. 
Thus, the impact of immigration on a local labour market may be dispersed through the whole 
economy. Therefore, it may be then more instrumental to measure immigration effects on the 
aggregate level. Finally, immigration studies may not take into account different adjustment 
mechanisms such as changes in the trade and output mix. 
 
More recent empirical studies split workers into different groups according to observable 
characteristics such as skills, age, education, work experience etc. This methodology is referred 
to as the skill-cell correlation approach. It accounts explicitly for the extent of natives and 
immigrants substitutability by splitting native and immigrant workers into different groups 
where in each group, natives and immigrants are assumed to be perfect substitutes. Then, the 
labour market outcomes of a specific cell are regressed on the relative share of immigrants in 
the labour supply of that cell.  
 
Card (2001) splits US natives and immigrants according to occupations but still finds very small 
effects on wage and unemployment. In contrast, Borjas (2003), who splits workers according to 
both education and work experience, finds that immigrants may significantly reduce wages of 
native workers in the same education and experience group. He finds a wage elasticity of about 
- 0.4 (a 1 percent increase in the number of workers due to immigration leads to a - 0.4 percent 
decrease in the gross wage), which is larger than the consensus estimate of the overview articles 
which find an elasticity of about - 0.1. Possibly, Borjas finds a more negative impact than Card   25 
because immigrants may not compete with natives in the same skill/occupation group if they 
have different working experiences. In addition, Borjas uses aggregate data from the US Census 
while Card uses local data. Finally, Ottaviano and Peri (2006) investigate the impact of 
immigration in US in a general equilibrium framework based on Borjas (2003) using aggregate 
data. The model allows capturing the effects of immigrants not only on their closest substitutes 
(negative effect) but on their complements as well (positive effect). In contrast to Borjas, the 
authors assume that immigrants are not perfect substitutes even within the same education and 
work experience cell (because of different occupational choices, abilities etc.). Furthermore, the 
authors explicitly account for the role of capital adjustment. After accounting for all of the 
effects, the authors find that the immigration influx of 1980-2000 has actually increased the 
average wage of native workers by about 2%. College and high school graduates gained the 
most, while high school dropouts experienced zero or small negative change. Ottaviano and 
Peri attempt to reconcile their results with the negative effects found in other studies. They 
claim that they also find a partial negative effect of immigrants on natives within the same 
group. However, the effects of increased wages of natives who are complements to immigrants 
and the increased return to capital dominate the first partial negative effect.  
 
Other adjustment processes 
The controversy on the actual impact of immigration suggests that it is instrumental to account 
for all possible adjustment mechanism that may affect the impact on wages and unemployment.  
 
First, natives may move out of areas with immigrants. Thus, immigration may leave the relative 
regional labour supply unchanged and consequently have no effect on wages and employment. 
There is however no consensus in the literature on the issue of native response. For instance, 
Borjas et al. (1997) and Hatton and Tani (2003) find that in the UK immigrant inflows and 
native outflows are correlated while Card (2001) finds that immigrant inflows to different cities 
in the US have not resulted in large outflows of native in the same skill group. Pischke and 
Velling (1997) also do not find evidence for native outflows in Germany, and Card and Dinardo 
(2000) conclude that the small impact on wages is caused by other adjustment mechanisms 
rather than native mobility. However, Longhi et al. (1999) find that larger areas exhibit more 
adverse immigration effects than smaller areas (because factors in smaller areas can adjust 
faster), supporting the claim that research should be aggregate rather than regional. The impact 
of immigration is also larger in countries with lower internal mobility. This supports the claim 
that native mobility may be a response to immigration. 
 
Second, increased labour supply may be absorbed by a changing industry structure. Card and 
Lewis (2005) find however that immigration has only a small effect on local industry structure. 
Instead, increased relative labour supply of a certain labour type in a region causes industries to 
use more intensively that labour type without changes in relative wages. In other words,   26 
production technology adapts to the local mix of worker skills. This could be explained with 
Acemoglu’s (1998) theory of skill biased technology, which suggests that firms innovate in a 
direction of readily available factors even without relative wage changes. Lewis (2003) finds 
that on-the-job computer use has increased more rapidly in US cities where the relative skilled 
labour supply grew the most. He concludes that standard trade models do not explain well 
adjustment to immigration since industries seem to respond by choosing a production 
technology that complements the local labour mix rather than increasing production of the 
relevant labour type intensive good. 
3.2  Public finances 
The fiscal impact of immigration is the net result of the payments in and out of the welfare state 
system of a host country by the immigrants over their life cycle. Immigrants contribute to fiscal 
balances by paying taxes and social security contributions, while they benefit from the welfare 
state in case they receive unemployment, disability and/or welfare benefits. They also benefit 
from public expenditures in the host country. 
 
In general, immigration may have a positive fiscal impact since immigrants usually arrive at 
working age and participate in the host country’s labour market. Thus, the host country enjoys 
the taxes paid by immigrant workers without the need to invest in their education since they 
have already acquired education in the country of origin. However, the labour market 
performance of immigrants may lag behind that of natives. In several countries, immigrants 
earn less, pay fewer taxes, and receive more often benefits than natives. Hence, there are 
worries that immigrants are in fact a burden to the welfare state. These worries are especially 
present in generous welfare states where immigrants may have difficulties in integrating in the 
labour market and welfare benefits are extensive. In this section, we present different factors 
such as immigrant characteristics and welfare state generosity that may affect the fiscal impact. 
We then discuss empirical studies in various countries. The fiscal impact is found to be positive 
in the US and in some European countries, and negative in other European countries. 
Theory 
The fiscal impact of  immigrants depends on several factors. First, the age of immigrants at 
entry is crucial since many public expenditures are related to age. Thus, young immigrants are 
expected to have a large net contribution over their life cycle since they received their education 
in the home country. In addition, they work and pay taxes. Second, direct taxes paid and most 
benefits received depend on earnings. Thus immigrants with a high probability of being 
employed and high earnings are likely to be net contributors. Therefore, high-skilled 
immigrants are expected to have a more positive impact than low-skilled immigrants. Finally, 
the generosity of the welfare state affects the impact as well. Low-skilled immigrants living in a   27 
generous welfare state may have a higher probability of being unemployed due to distortions 
resulting from high replacement rates and minimum wages. Thus, they will pay fewer taxes and 
receive more often benefits than in a less generous welfare state. Conversely, high-skilled 
immigrants may have equal opportunities to find employment in whatever type of welfare state. 
We may expect them not to draw much on benefits in any welfare state. With respect to their 
contributions, high-skilled immigrants may pay more taxes in a generous welfare state as 
income tax rates are higher. But in a less generous welfare state they may also pay higher taxes 
due to a larger income inequality and higher earnings. For these reasons, the theoretical link 
between the welfare state and the fiscal impact of immigration is ambiguous. 
Empirical evidence 
There are several studies that measure whether immigrants are net contributors or net 
beneficiaries of the welfare state. Initially, empirical evidence focused on calculating the net 
taxes that immigrants pay in a certain year. However, it is instrumental to take into account the 
net contributions that immigrants make over their life cycle since taxes, benefits and public 
expenditure depend much on age. In this section, we review studies that measure the impact of 
immigrants over their life cycle rather than just looking at total taxes received minus total 
benefits paid to immigrants in a certain year. 
Most studies use a Generational Accounting (GA) approach in order to assess the lifetime fiscal 
impact of immigrants. The GA approach consists of calculating the present value of the lifetime 
net contribution of an immigrant to public finances (Auerbach and Oreopoulos, 1999). In other 
words, the present value of a lifetime net contribution is equal to total remaining lifetime tax 
contributions minus total remaining lifetime benefits from public expenditure. If the present 
value is positive, the immigrant is a net contributor to public finances.  
The results of studies on the lifetime fiscal impact of immigration vary by country. Numerous 
studies find it to be positive and suggest that immigrants may even alleviate the fiscal 
imbalances associated with the ageing problem. Recent studies for the US conclude that 
immigrants are net contributors to public finances (Lee and Miller, 1997, Auerbach and 
Oreopoulos, 1999, Storeseletten, 1999). In addition, an increased rate of immigration to the US 
(with the same characteristics as current immigrants) could even improve the fiscal balance, 
though the improvement is very small relative to the overall size of the fiscal imbalance. Thus, 
it seems that immigrants  ‘pay their way into the welfare state’ in the US.
1 The improvement 
could be considerable if the composition of immigrants is changed rather than the amount. 
Storesletten (1999) finds that admitting high-skilled immigrants in the age of 20-54 or medium-
skilled immigrants in the age of 25-49 would balance the fiscal budget of US.  
 
 
1 The term ‘pay their way into the welfare state’ is widely used in the immigration literature to say that immigrants are not a 
fiscal burden to the host country.   28 
The fiscal impact of immigration is also found to be positive in several European countries.  
To illustrate, the net fiscal contribution of an average immigrant in Germany is 53,100 euros 
(Bonin et al., 2000).
2 Additionally, increasing the amount of immigrants (with the same 
characteristics as current ones) can reduce the fiscal imbalance. An annual inflow of 50,000 
immigrants to Italy could reduce the fiscal imbalance by 6% (Moscorola, 2001). Collado et al. 
(2004) and Mayr (2004) draw similar conclusions for Spain and Austria. Relative to the US, the 
beneficial impact of immigrants on the fiscal imbalances in the above mentioned European 
countries is larger. This could be because US already admits large flows of immigrants and 
faces a smaller fiscal imbalance problem than most of the European countries.
3 However, 
similarly to the US studies, European empirical evidence points out that admitting high-skilled 
immigrants in certain ages can contribute even more to reducing fiscal imbalances. 
 
While some European welfare systems benefit from immigration, other European welfare 
systems turn out to lose. For the Netherlands, Roodenburg et al. (2003) find that immigrants 
need to posses social and economic characteristics at least similar to those of the Dutch in order 
to have a positive impact. However, most current non-Western immigrants to the Netherlands 
lag well behind the Dutch in terms of their labour market performance. Thus, the overall fiscal 
impact of immigrants in the Netherlands is negative. The authors emphasize that immigrants 
with better characteristics than the Dutch, the so called high-performing immigrants, have a 
positive fiscal impact for almost all ages. Storesletten (2003) draws similar conclusions for 
Sweden. He finds that an average new immigrant to Sweden constitutes a net cost of about 
$20,000 to the government. However, in contrast to the Netherlands, young immigrants in the 
age of 20-30 are still a net gain of about $23,000. Finally, Wadensjo and Gerdes (2004) find 
that the public sector in Denmark effectively redistributes from natives to immigrants. While 
the net transfers of Danes and Western immigrants were positive in 1991-2000, the net transfers 
of first- and even second-generation non-Western immigrants were negative.  
Discussion 
The countries mentioned above may experience different fiscal impacts of immigration because 
of several reasons. First, as discussed earlier, the fiscal impact is largely determined by the 
labour market performance of immigrants. Thus, the negative fiscal impact in the Netherlands, 
Denmark and Sweden could be due to the low labour market performance of immigrants in 
those countries. Consider, for example, Germany and US where immigrants earn on average 
17% and 20% respectively less than the natives (Lang, 2005, Borjas, 1990). In contrast, non-
Western immigrants in the Netherlands earn almost 30% less than the natives while the wage 
differential between immigrants and natives in Sweden is even larger, up to 37% (Roodenburg 
 
2 Based on the assumption that government expenditure (such as defence spending) increases with immigration. If 
government expenditure does not increase with immigration , the net fiscal contribution would be 134,000 euros. 
3 US may have a smaller fiscal imbalance because the ageing problem there is less severe than in Europe.    29 
et al., 2003, Hansen and Lofstrom, 2003). The earnings lag of immigrants in Denmark behind 
the natives is smaller than in the Netherlands and Sweden, about 15% (Husted et al., 2001), but 
their participation rate in the labour force is lower than that of the natives by 25% (Pedersen and 
Smith, 2001). Conversely, the participation rate of immigrants in Germany is lower than the 
natives by only 3%, and Spanish immigrants participate in the labour force even by 12%-points 
more than natives (OECD, 2003). Therefore, countries with immigrants that assimilate fast on 
the labour market will experience fiscal gains from immigration while countries with large 
amounts of unemployed or low paid immigrants will experience a fiscal loss from immigration.  
 
Second, one may notice that the countries with a negative fiscal impact have more generous 
welfare systems than the countries with a positive fiscal impact. Thus, the extent of welfare 
state generosity and type of welfare system may play a role in explaining the differences 
between the countries. More generous welfare states have extensive benefits and thus lose more 
when the labour market performance of immigrants is low. In addition, we have discussed in 
chapter 2 that generous welfare states may act as welfare magnets, which results in negative 
self-selection. Thus, the labour market performance of immigrants in generous welfare states 
may be worse because immigrants are negatively self-selected a priori. A related point is the 
idea of ethnic networks transferring information about the welfare system to newly arrived 
immigrants (Borjas and Hilton, 1996). If generous welfare states have more welfare dependent 
immigrants (because of the reasons mentioned above), a snowball effect may occur when new 
immigrants are pulled into the welfare system as they receive more information from previous 
immigrants about welfare benefits rather than job opportunities. Bertrand et al. (2000) claim 
that being surrounded by people informed about the welfare system decreases the costs of 
applying for welfare, increases the return from applying for welfare and decreases information 
about job availability. Economically significant network effects of welfare information were 
found in the US by both Borjas and Hilton (1996) and Bertrand et al(2000). All in all, the more 
there are already welfare dependent immigrants in a country, the more we can expect new 
immigrants to become welfare dependent as well. This effect may be particularly pronounced in 
generous welfare countries. 
3.3  Conclusions 
From economic theory we know that immigration has an impact on the labour market and the 
public finances of the host country. The inflow of immigrants decreases the wages of native 
workers to which they are substitutes, and increases the wages of workers to which they are 
complements. If wages are not flexible, immigration may lead to involuntary unemployment. 
The overall impact may however be small since production factors like labour and capital adjust 
to immigration. This dampens the impact of immigration on wages and unemployment. The 
extensive empirical evidence on the impact of immigration on the labour market confirms the   30 
latter prediction: the impact of immigration on wages is likely to be negative but small. The 
consensus estimate for the wage elasticity is about - 0.1, while the estimate of Borjas (2003) of 
about - 0.4 may be interpreted as an upper bound. The scarce empirical evidence on the impact 
on unemployment hints at a small effect as well. 
 
Immigration is likely to affect the fiscal balances of a host country. Immigrants pay taxes and 
social security contributions, they may draw on the welfare system, and they may enjoy public 
expenditure such as on education. Studies for various countries measure the contributions to and 
the benefits from the welfare state system of immigrants over their life cycle. On the whole, the 
fiscal impact of immigration depends on the characteristics of the immigrants and the 
generosity of the welfare state. Young immigrants are likely to contribute to the fiscal balances 
as they have acquired their education already and they can start to work at arrival. Moreover, 
high-skilled immigrants contribute to the fiscal balances while low-skilled immigrants 
contribute little. The fiscal impact of low-skilled immigrants even turns out to be negative in 
generous welfare state systems.  
 
The evidence in this chapter yields that the selection of immigrants has important effects since 
immigrant characteristics affect the magnitude of the impact on the labour market and the fiscal 
balances. As was discussed in chapter 2, these characteristics are affected by immigration 
policy and welfare state design. So, immigration policy and welfare state design are likely to 
affect immigrant selection and hence the impact of immigration on the host country. As the two 
types of policy are interconnected they need to be both taken into account simultaneously. In 
the next chapter, we develop a framework to asses this particular interaction and the basis of the 
theoretical and empirical knowledge collected in this chapter.   31 
4  Analytical framework: a qualitative approach 
We explore the interaction between immigration and welfare state policy using a qualitative 
approach. We investigate the impact of different immigration regimes in two possible welfare 
state settings. Section 4.1 discusses the scenarios for the immigration regimes, and section 4.2 
discusses the scenarios for the welfare states. 
4.1  Immigration policy 
The goal of immigration policy design is to develop a set of measures that meets potential goals 
of economic policy. The design boils down to an proper assessment of the most important trade-
offs. There is a large number of potential immigration policies as trade-offs appear in multiple 
dimensions. As it is impossible to explore them all, this section aims to structure the 
investigation on the design by distinguishing two key dimensions along which immigration 
policy can be characterised. From this, we develop three different immigration regimes. 
 
Two major issues of immigration policy are the amount of human capital of immigrants and the 
duration of stay. Human capital is important for the labour market prospects of immigrants, as 
virtually all countries select among potential labour migrants. While non-immigration countries 
mostly rely on a demand-driven system in which labour migrants need to have an employment 
contract, immigration countries like Australia and Canada use point systems for selection 
purposes. Educational attainment and occupational skills play an important role. Currently, 
several non-immigration countries have introduced or are considering to introduce similar point 
systems. The duration of stay is important as well. While most of the typical immigration 
countries offer permanent residence to immigrants, most European countries provide at first 
instance just temporary residence. In many European countries temporary permits can be 
transferred into permanent permits in case the immigrant has been employed for a sufficiently 
long period. Only in a few countries, of which Switzerland is a prominent example, temporary 
migrants are expected to leave the country at the end of the permitted residence period. The 
duration of stay clearly has policy implications. First, countries compete for the best immigrants 
and immigrants may choose for countries that offer a permanent permit, or at least an 
opportunity to get such a permit in case of a good labour market performance. Second, 
immigrants in countries that offer a temporary permit may invest less in country specific human 
capital, and may therefore be less productive. Third, immigrants with permanent permits get the 
same rights as natives, and in a generous welfare state the incentives to be productive may 
become small at the lower end of the labour market. 
 
By combining the two key dimensions we obtain four possible models for  immigration policy 
(figure 4.1). First, the lower-left quadrant reflects a TEMPORARY POLICY as it allows low-skilled   32 
immigrants to work in a host country on a temporary basis. This policy attracts substantial 
attention from economists and policy makers (see, for example, Boeri et al. (2003), Martin et 
al., (2006)). A host country gains as the low-skilled labour immigrants are willing to take up 
jobs that natives refuse, while the labour immigrants also gain as they are able to earn more than 
in their home country. The temporary aspect is however crucial: in case it is not enforced 
properly the policy may end up as a permanent policy. Second, the lower-right quadrant reflects 
an OPEN POLICY as it allows immigrants to enter the country freely. Due to the push factors in 
immigration the policy is likely to result in a relatively large share of low-skilled immigrants. 
Third, the upper-right quadrant reflects a SELECTIVE POLICY as only immigrants with valuable 
human capital will be allowed to enter the country. One may think of a supply-driven system 
like a point system that offers labour migrants a permanent permit, but also  of a demand-driven 
system that provides a temporary duration of stay with an option for a permanent permit in case 
the migrant is employed sufficiently long. While a supply-driven system may have an 
advantage in attracting the best immigrants, a demand-driven system has the advantage of 
guaranteed employment in the initial years. This trade off between a supply and a demand 
driven system, despite its importance, is beyond the scope of the study. 









TEMPORARY POLICY  OPEN POLICY
SELECTIVE POLICY
 
a The temporary policy is considered to be temporary as the government offers residencies with a limited duration without 
offering a possibility to extent the stay of duration. The permanent policies may offer permanent residencies, but may as well 
offer temporary residencies with an option of extension in the case of a good labour market performance.  
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In this study, we will not consider the upper-left quadrant of figure 4.1 as the policy does not 
seem credible: a temporary policy for high-skilled workers is likely to fail in attracting the 
desired immigrants. Furthermore, the residence period may simply be too short to overcome the 
costs of the relatively long training period for high-skilled jobs.   
4.2  Welfare state design 
The goal of welfare state design is to develop two welfare states that reflect differences in 
preferences with respect to the trade-off between efficiency and equity. So compared to the 
previous section, we distinguish only one key dimension along which welfare state policy can 
be characterised. In one welfare state efficiency is more important, while the other welfare state 
equity aspects dominate. 
 
The first is a RESIDUAL WELFARE STATE with low tax rates and low benefit levels, while the 
second one is a UNIVERSAL WELFARE STATE with high tax rates and high benefit levels. The 
welfare states resemble two of the three ones defined in De Mooij (2006). For this study there is 
no need to parameterise the different elements of each welfare state, like tax rates and benefit 
levels, as we will not quantify the impact of immigration. Furthermore, in contrast to the 
previous study we do not explore the trade-off between centralisation and decentralisation. The 
reason is that the impact of the different immigration scenarios are less clear-cut along this 
dimension. Our main purpose is to indicate how welfare states that differ in a lot of aspects may 
react to immigration, rather than to discuss the impact on all possible countries and systems. For 
readers less familiar with De Mooij (2006), the two welfare states partly resemble the well-
known welfare state typology of Esping-Anderson (1990). The RESIDUAL WELFARE STATE 
resembles the liberal welfare states, which cover countries like the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Ireland, while the  UNIVERSAL WELFARE STATE resembles the social-democratic 
welfare states, which cover the Scandinavian countries Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland.  
 
The RESIDUAL WELFARE STATE focuses on individual responsibility, where the government 
supports the most vulnerable groups via targeted measures. For the large group of middle and 
high incomes, public provisions are largely phased out. The labour market is relatively flexible. 
Due to a relatively low degree of employment protection, lay-off rates are high and replacement 
rates of unemployed are low. Tight eligibility rules and the possibility of sanctions stimulate the 
search effort of the unemployed. In addition, sectoral trade unions attend more weight in the 
wage bargaining process to employment rather than to wages. 
 
The UNIVERSAL WELFARE STATE provides collective, generous welfare state arrangements. 
Complementary policies like child care subsidies, activation of the low-skilled and education 
subsidies avoid severe distortions of labour markets. This further expands public spending, but   34 
these expenditures are geared towards participation. Universal income security and uniform 
public services mitigate poverty and ensure equal opportunities. Stringent rules, mandatory 
workfare and tough sanctions complement these provisions to maintain a high level of 
participation. The philosophy is to organise insurance via explicit social insurance. Employment 
protection is rather severe in this welfare state, but due to high participation it may nevertheless 
be less severe than in the current Dutch situation. The labour market therefore becomes 
somewhat more flexible, and this increases the ability to integrate outsiders. Sectoral trade 
unions are relatively centralised and partly internalise the consequences of their behaviour on 
outsiders, but nevertheless put weight on wages at the expense of employment. 
 
As the welfare states differ in their average tax burden, benefit levels and labour market 
institutions, labour market outcomes also differ across welfare states (table 4.1). In this study 
we will not discuss these differences. Interested readers find the results for one particular 
parameterisation of the welfare states in De Mooij (2006). Here, we will focus on the impact per 
welfare state caused by various immigration regimes. 
Table 4.1  Characteristics of two possible welfare states 
a
 
  Residual  Universal 
Taxes and benefits     
 Tax rates  low  high 
 Benefit levels  low  high 
 Redistribution  little  much 
     
Labour market regulation     
 Minimum wages  low  high 
 Employment protection  little  Much 
 Union wage bargaining  little  Much 
     
Labour market outcomes     
 Labour supply  high  Medium 
 Real gross wage rate  high  Medium 
 Unemployment  low  medium 
 GDP  high  medium 
  a
 See De Mooij (2006) for a possible parameterisation of the welfare states. The labour market outcomes are calculated for the same 
demographic projection for the population. The public deficit is assumed to be the same percentage of GD for each welfare state. 
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4.3  Position within the literature 
The qualitative approach with a design of the different policy options fits into the CPB study on 
welfare state design (De Mooij, 2006). The approach is however new within the literature on 
immigration and welfare states. The literature contains two approaches: a theoretical one based 
on macro modelling, and a empirical one based on international comparisons using survey data. 
Studies on the macro modelling of immigration mostly try to answer one of the following two 
questions: what is the general equilibrium effect of immigration on the economic outcomes of 
the natives? And what is political economy effect of immigration on the welfare state? The first 
question is handled by articles like Smidt et al. (1994), Sarris and Zografakis (1999) and Ferri et 
al. (2002). In particular the last two articles apply their models to specific countries, namely  
Greece and Spain. The second question is handled by articles that model the political economy 
of the welfare state. These models generally show that immigration may alter the preferences 
and therefore the voting behaviour of natives. This may lead to changes in the welfare state 
(Razin and Sadka, 2000, 2005, Kemnitz, 2002, and Börner and Uebelmesse, 2007).  
 
The availability of international comparable survey data allows the explicit comparison of the 
labour market position and welfare state dependency of immigrants between countries. For this 
purpose, Boeri et al. (2002) and Boeri (2006) use the European Community Household Survey. 
One general finding is that the individual characteristics if immigrants are more important than 
country and welfare state specific effects. In particular Boeri et al. (2002) discusses the 
interaction between immigration and welfare state policy in debt (see chapter 2 for discussion). 
 
The position of the current study within the literature is that it assesses the interaction between 
immigration and welfare state in a qualitative fashion. The policy options described in this 
chapter will offer a comprehensive but qualitative overview of the interaction. The 
aforementioned literature is summarized in chapters 2 and 3, and will be taken into account 
explicitly in the assessment of the likely outcomes. This will be done in the next chapter. 
 
 
   36   37 
5  The impact of immigration 
In this chapter, we investigate the impact of a particular immigration shock in a welfare state in 
the medium to long-term run, say 25 years. For example, is an extensive welfare state 
(‘UNIVERSAL WELFARE STATE’) more vulnerable to permanent low-skilled immigration than a 
minimal welfare stare (‘RESIDUAL WELFARE STATE’)? Which system envisages the highest 
impact on wages? And what is the impact on public finances in each of the welfare states? 
 
We present the impact of the immigration regimes on the labour market and public finances in a 
qualitative fashion. We assume that the underlying demographic projection is the same for each 
welfare state. An immigration shock will cause a deviation from the baseline demographic 
projection in each of the welfare states and hence a deviation from the baseline economic 
projection. Note that this central projection is welfare state dependent due to the differences in 
taxes, benefit levels and labour market institutions (see chapter 4). In this study we are not 
interested in these baseline projections per welfare state, but we analyze the impact per welfare 
state caused by the different immigration regimes. 
 
Immigration regimes are assumed to be implemented in the near future, and to lead to a gradual 
increase in the population in the long run. The labour migrants may be high- or low-skilled. We 
will specify in more detail what we mean by temporary and permanent immigrants. Temporary 
workers are considered to have a work permit with a limited duration. Every year a certain 
group of labour migrants is allowed to enter the country. At the end of the residence period they 
leave. We assume that the temporary migrants supply labour as if they were single individuals 
of a certain skill type. Of course they may have families, but they stay in the country of origin. 
In contrast to this, permanent labour migrants get a work permit with an unlimited duration. 
They are allowed to take their family with them and their partners  may also be employed. As 
several of them will stay, they will age in the host country as well. For this reason, a permanent 
immigration policy will lead to a increase of the population with mixed skill types. For 
example, high-skilled labour migrants may bring partners and children, and some of them will 
be low-skilled. The policy will lead to more pensioners as the labour migrants will age in the 
host country. This is an important point of difference with  a temporary immigration policy, in 
which all labour migrants are in working age and may be of one particular skill type.  
5.1  Temporary immigration of low-skilled workers 
The TEMPORARY POLICY constitutes temporary immigration of low-skilled workers. The regime 
offers impermanent residence permits that cannot be extended. The regime additionally includes 
an active and credible return policy. The latter aspect is crucial, and we return to it in the next 
chapter. As labour migrants are assumed to be singles of working age, their demographic   38 
structure is very different from the one of the natives. The fiscal impact of the policy is likely to 
be positive as many of the labour migrants work and pay income taxes, and few of them will be 
dependent on transfers from the welfare state. But is there reason to believe that the impact is 
more positive in one welfare state compared to the other? This section discusses the details and 
the economic and fiscal consequences of the policy. 





  Residual  Universal 
     
Working age population 
c
     
  low-skilled  ++  ++ 
  high-skilled  □  □ 
     
Labour supply (natives)     
  low-skilled  - -  - - 
  high-skilled  ++  ++ 
     
Real gross wage rate     
  low-skilled  - -  - 
  high-skilled  ++  + 
     
Unemployment 
d
     
  low-skilled  +  ++ 
  high-skilled  -   - - 
     
Fiscal impact  ++  ++ 
     
Total GDP  ++  ++ 
GDP accruing to natives  ++  ++ 
  a
 The policy allows low-skilled labour migrants to enter on a temporary basis. The host country population increases with a certain 
percentage as every year a fixed amount of temporary work permits is granted (see chapter 4 for details). 
b
 The residual welfare state has low tax rates and low benefit levels, while the universal welfare state has high tax rates and high benefit 
levels (see chapter 4 and De Mooij, 2006). 
c
 The outcomes are: strong increase (++), moderately strong increase (+), almost no change (□), moderately strong decrease (-), strong 
decrease (- -). The outcomes can be compared horizontally, i.e. between welfare states and between immigration policies, but not 
vertically, i.e. between the different economic outcomes. The reason for the latter comparison not to be possible is that magnitude of the 
adjustments varies substantially between outcomes. 
d
 In the universal welfare state we assume the wage bargaining process to affect the level of unemployment. This is actually open to 
discussion as the literature on wage bargaining states that centralised unions may incorporate the external effect of their wage claim on 
unemployment. The empirical literature does not show consensus on this issue.  
 
In the temporary immigration regime, each year a limited group of labour migrants is allowed to 
enter the labour market of the host country. As the immigration flow consists by assumption of 
single persons only immigrants do not apply for child care and educational facilities in the host 
country. However, one may assume that they are entitled to child allowances and send the 
money abroad to their families. In addition, the employee part of pension premiums may be 
reimbursed and transferred to the home country as well. During their stay in the host country, 
the labour migrants are eligible to long term care, unemployment and disability payments and 
government assistance as they have the same rights as the inland population. This is in line with   39 
international treaties on international labour migration. Of course, such treaties may change 
over time, and they may make immigration more or less profitable for the host country. We do 
however not discuss what the consequences of changes in the rights of immigrants will be for 
migration flows and their fiscal consequences. 
 
The temporary immigration policy causes the working age population of low-skilled to increase 
rather strongly (table 5.1). Depending on the exact definition of low-skilled, a 1% increase of 
the overall population will cause an increase of this particular group with much more than 1%. 
The working age population of high-skilled is likely to increase slightly as natives may upgrade 
their skills. Nevertheless we interpret this small change as being close to zero.  
 
In both welfare states we expect the labour supply of low-skilled natives to decrease, and of the 
high-skilled natives to increase. In the residual welfare state this will be mainly due to changes 
in the real gross wage, while in the universal welfare state a discouraged worker effect due to an 
increase in the unemployment level may play a role. In the universal welfare state the real gross 
wages may be expected to decrease less than in the residual welfare state due to differences the 
wage bargaining process. In a universal welfare state, the downward pressure on wages may be 
partly transmitted to unemployment as unions may not be willing to accept a more substantial 
decrease in wages. In both welfare states, the impact on the high-skilled workers is relatively 
large as the inflow of low-skilled workers is relatively large. The high-skilled are better off in 
terms of real wages, and they react by increasing their labour supply. 
 
The fiscal impact of the temporary immigration policy is positive in both welfare states: the 
labour migrants, arrive, work, pay taxes, and leave. They do not age in the host country, and 
they do not bring partners and children. Of course there may be some counteracting effects: 
they may nevertheless receive child benefits and send the money home, they may be able to 
take some of their accumulated pension rights with them, and they may consume less than 
average in the host country as they will save a substantial part of their income to take it home. 
This will however not undo the positive fiscal impact as the net result of paying taxes and 
hardly having claims on the welfare state is clearly positive. 
 
As all migrants are of working age and almost all of them will work, Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) will increase substantially. A large part of the increase will be paid to the labour 
migrants in the form of wages. The increase in GDP accruing to natives may nevertheless be 
substantial as the positive fiscal impact may be used for productive purposes like decreasing 
taxes. The increase in GDP per head is hardly driven by the so-called immigration surplus, 
which is known to be rather small (Borjas (1999)). But despite the many potential positive 
effects of the policy, clearly not everyone is better off as low-skilled natives lose due to their 
lower real gross wages.   40 
5.2  Permanent immigration of low-skilled workers 
The OPEN  POLICY constitutes a liberal (non-selective) immigration policy, which because of 
push factors in immigration leads to a relatively high share of low-skilled immigrants. For 
reasons of comparison between the different immigration regimes we assume the number of 
immigrants to be limited to a certain maximum amount. In other words, we ignore the fact that 
an open policy may attract a relatively large number of immigrants. Furthermore, we assume 
the policy to lead to permanent immigration. This does not necessarily mean that immigrants 
receive a permanent permit upon arrival; immigrants may also receive a temporary permit with 
an option to stay after a certain period of employment.  
 
In the open immigration regime, each year a number of non-selected labour immigrants enters 
the country. So initially the demographic and skill structure of immigrants and natives differs 
substantially as the labour immigrants are of working age, and relatively low-skilled. Over time 
the demographic and skill structure of the immigrants becomes however more similar to the one 
of natives: the immigrants will become eligible to family reunification, the immigrants will age 
themselves, and the children may become more skilled than their parents. On the really long 
run, one may even expect the (former) immigrants and the natives to become completely 
similar. But before this has taken place, the regime will lead to an immigrant population with 
relatively many low-skilled individuals. 
  
The open immigration policy causes the working age population of low-skilled workers to 
increase (table 5.2), but the increase is less strong than for the temporary immigration policy 
(compare table 5.1). The working age population of high-skilled is may increase slightly as 
natives may upgrade their skills, but again this happens at a lower intensity than for the 
temporary immigration policy. 
 
In both welfare states we expect a moderate change in the labour supply of low-skilled and 
high-skilled natives. In the residual welfare state this will again be due mainly to changes in the 
real gross wage, while in the universal welfare state a discouraged worker effect may play a 
role. In both welfare states, the high-skilled workers are slightly better off in terms of real 
wages and unemployment, and they react by increasing their labour supply. 
 
The fiscal impact of the open immigration policy is negative in both welfare states: the low-
skilled labour migrants may have a job in the first years after arrival, but afterwards their 
employment opportunities are likely to diminish slowly over time and they may become 
dependent on the welfare state. As argued in section 3.2, this partly depends on the welfare 
state. In a residual welfare state the fiscal impact is small as benefit levels are low and the 
amount of redistribution from high-skilled to low-skilled is limited. In a universal welfare state   41 
the fiscal impact is large, and low-skilled immigrants are more likely to become a burden to 
welfare state.  





  Residual  Universal 
     
Working age population 
c
     
  low-skilled  +  + 
  high-skilled  □  □ 
     
Labour supply (natives)     
  low-skilled  -   -  
  high-skilled  +  + 
     
Real gross wage rate     
  low-skilled  -   □ 
  high-skilled  +  □ 
     
Unemployment 
d
     
  low-skilled  □  + 
  high-skilled  □  -  
     
Fiscal impact   -   - -  
     
Total GDP  +  + 
GDP accruing to natives  -   - -  
  a
 The policy allows labour migrants to enter the country on a non-selective basis. Due to push factors in immigration, the policy leads to a 
relatively high share of low-skilled immigrants (see chapter 4 for details). 
b
 The residual welfare state has low tax rates and low benefit levels, while the universal welfare state has high tax rates and high benefit 
levels (see chapter 4 and De Mooij, 2006). 
c
 The outcomes are: strong increase (++), moderately strong increase (+), almost no change (□), moderately strong decrease (-), strong 
decrease (- -). The outcomes can be compared horizontally, i.e. between welfare states and between immigration policies, but not 
vertically, i.e. between the different economic outcomes. The reason for the latter comparison not to be possible is that magnitude of the 
adjustments varies substantially between outcomes. 
d
 In the universal welfare state we assume the wage bargaining process to affect the level of unemployment. This is actually open to 
discussion as the literature on wage bargaining states that centralised unions may incorporate the external effect of their wage claim on 
unemployment. The empirical literature does not show consensus on this issue.  
 
Permanent low-skilled immigration causes GDP to increase, but a large part of the increase is 
paid to the immigrants in the form of wages. As the immigrants are low-skilled and this type of 
workers is more likely to become dependent on the welfare state, the GDP accruing to natives is 
likely to be negative. And this will be particularly true in the universal welfare state, in which 
benefit levels are rather high. 
5.3  Permanent immigration of high-skilled workers 
The SELECTIVE  POLICY selects labour migrants on the basis of their education, skills and work 
experience. We assume the policy to be open ended in terms of the number of immigrants per 
year. Nevertheless we expect the number of immigrants per year to be limited due to the   42 
competitiveness of the international labour markets. We assume immigrants get either a 
permanent permit or temporary permits with an option of extension in case of a successful 
employment career. 





  Residual  Universal 
     
Working age population 
c
     
  low-skilled  □  □ 
  high-skilled  +  + 
     
Labour supply (natives)     
  low-skilled  +  + 
  high-skilled  -   -  
     
Real gross wage rate     
  low-skilled  +  □ 
  high-skilled  -   □ 
     
Unemployment 
d
     
  low-skilled  □  -  
  high-skilled  □  + 
     
Fiscal impact  +   ++  
     
Total GDP  ++  ++ 
GDP accruing to natives  +  ++ 
  a
 The policy allows labour migrants to enter the country on a selective basis, leading to a relatively high share of high-skilled immigrants. 
Not all immigrants will be high-skilled however, as family members of which a part are low-skilled are allowed to enter as well (see 
chapter 4 for details). 
b
 The residual welfare state has low tax rates and low benefit levels, while the universal welfare state has high tax rates and high benefit 
levels (see chapter 4 and De Mooij, 2006). 
c
 The outcomes are: strong increase (++), moderately strong increase (+), almost no change (□), moderately strong decrease (-), strong 
decrease (- -). The outcomes can be compared horizontally, i.e. between welfare states and between immigration policies, but not 
vertically, i.e. between the different economic outcomes. The reason for the latter comparison not to be possible is that magnitude of the 
adjustments varies substantially between outcomes. 
d
 In the universal welfare state we assume the wage bargaining process to affect the level of unemployment. This is actually open to 
discussion as the literature on wage bargaining states that centralised unions may incorporate the external effect of their wage claim on 
unemployment. The empirical literature does not show consensus on this issue.  
 
Like the open regime the demographic and skill structure of immigrants and natives will differ 
initially. But again the demographic and skill composition of immigrants and natives will 
become more alike over time. The immigrants become eligible to family reunification, and they 
age themselves. So overall the regime leads to an immigrant population with relatively many 
high-skilled individuals, but clearly not all immigrants will be high-skilled and in working age.  
  
The selective policy causes the working age population of high-skilled workers to increase 
(table 5.3). The working age population of low-skilled may increase slightly as the incentive to 
acquire skills becomes somewhat smaller. Nevertheless this effect is likely to be limited.    43 
In both welfare states, we expect a moderate change in the labour supply. In case of low-skilled 
natives we expect a moderate increase, and for high-skilled natives a moderate decrease. In the 
residual welfare state changes in the real gross wage trigger the results, while in the universal 
welfare state there may again be a discouraged worker effect. In both welfare states, the low-
skilled workers are better off in terms of real wages and unemployment, and they react by 
increasing their labour supply. 
 
The fiscal impact of the selective immigration policy is positive in both welfare states as high-
skilled workers are net contributors. In a residual welfare state the fiscal impact is relatively 
small as tax rates are rather low: the welfare state only collects a limited amount of extra tax 
revenues. In a universal welfare state the fiscal impact is larger as tax proceeds rise more 
substantially. Here the arrival of high-skilled immigrants is particularly good news as there are 
more high-skilled workers to redistribute from. 
 
Permanent high-skilled immigration causes GDP to increase. Part of the increase is paid to the 
immigrants in the form of wages, and the immigration surplus is known to be rather small. The 
positive fiscal impact causes however a second and probably more important effect on the GDP 
accruing to natives. This is particularly true in a universal welfare state, as tax rates are high. 
5.4  Conclusions 
This chapter considers three options for immigration policy: a TEMPORARY POLICY in which a 
limited number of low-skilled labour migrants are allowed to enter the country on a temporary 
basis, an OPEN POLICY in which there are almost no restrictions leading to many low-skilled 
labour migrants, and a SELECTIVE POLICY in which only high-skilled labour migrants are 
allowed to enter the country. The options for immigration policy have been applied to two 
different welfare state designs: a RESIDUAL WELFARE STATE, with low taxes and low benefit 
levels, and a UNIVERSAL WELFARE STATE, with high taxes and high benefit levels.  
 
Before we discuss the conclusions of the qualitative exercise, we need to make a remark on a 
difference in interpretation of the policy options on immigration and welfare state. While the 
options for the welfare state have been shaped along the equity-efficiency trade off and 
optimality depends on social preferences, the options for migration policy have not been not 
shaped along dimensions that represent basic trade offs in social preferences. Therefore one 
option may - in theory - dominate another policy in terms of outcomes. As however all policy 
options will have winners and losers among the natives, there will not exist an immigration 
regime in which all natives are better off than in all other regimes. So optimality still depends 
on social preferences. 
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General conclusions of the welfare states are: a TEMPORARY POLICY has a substantial positive 
impact on GDP accruing to natives. A major reason for the positive outcome is that the labour 
migrants arrive, work, pay taxes and social security contributions, and leave. The policy does 
however not lead to an improvement for all natives as at least in the short run low-skilled 
natives are likely to face lower wages and higher unemployment. An OPEN POLICY is likely to 
have a negative impact on GDP accruing to natives. The policy will lead to an increase in the 
number of low-skilled in a host country, and the low-skilled generally do not have a positive 
impact on the fiscal balances of a country. The overall outcome nevertheless depends on the 
design of the welfare state; in particular in a country with an extensive welfare state the policy 
will have a negative impact. Still high-skilled natives may gain as wages of low-skilled workers 
decrease. A SELECTIVE POLICY is likely to have a positive on GDP accruing to natives. The 
reason that we explored in this study is that high-skilled immigrants are likely to contribute to 
the fiscal balances of a host country. And besides this reason, there may actually be more 
arguments for a positive impact of high-skilled immigrants (see the second-last paragraph of the 
introduction). Still the policy may not lead to an improvement for all natives as at least in the 
short run the high-skilled natives will face more competition on the labour market. 
 
A first general conclusion can be drawn by combining the conclusions on the temporary and the 
open policy: the risks associated with a temporary immigration policy should be taken explicitly 
into account in the design of an immigration strategy. Potentially, such a temporary policy 
yields a substantial positive impact on the public finances. The temporary aspect is however 
crucial: if it is not enforced properly one may end up in an open immigration policy. Such an 
outcome is the worst of the three immigration scenario’s as it puts the welfare state under severe 
pressure. So unless proven to be effective, for example in a small scale experiment, it is not 
advisable to introduce such a policy.  
 
A second general conclusion can be drawn by combining the conclusions of chapter 2 - on the 
selection of immigrants - and chapter 5 - on the economic impact of immigration in different 
welfare states: self-selection of immigrants, caused by their rational economic behaviour, is a 
curse for the welfare state. Immigrants select countries which give them the highest net pay-off. 
High-skilled labour migrants are therefore likely to choose for countries with low taxes and an 
unequal wage distribution. These countries gain relatively little from immigration as the gain 
largely goes to the immigrants themselves. On the other hand, countries with a redistributive 
welfare state would like to attract high-skilled labour to redistribute from. They face however 
difficulties in attracting such migrants. This illustrates the simultaneity in the decision on 
immigration policy and welfare state design: a choice for a redistributive welfare state almost 
automatically limits the scope of a selective immigration policy. 
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6  Lessons for Dutch immigration policy 
The conclusions of chapters 2 to 5 will be used to discuss two recent proposals on immigration 
policy. The study was not initiated to evaluate policy proposals explicitly. Nevertheless it is 
natural to relate the conclusions to the proposal of the Dutch government (Dutch Ministry of 
Justice, 2006) and the alternative proposal of the Social and Economic Council of the 
Netherlands (SER, 2007). The exercise should be interpreted as a partial evaluation as we only 
discuss the interaction between immigration policy and welfare state design. The  first section 
discusses the two proposals in more detail. The second section relates the conclusions of the 
study to the proposals. 
6.1  Two recent policy proposals 
The former Dutch government has put immigration policy prominently on the political agenda 
by proposing a reorganisation of the policy (Dutch Ministry of Justice, 2006). One objective of 
the proposal is to make admission policy more transparent, while another objective is to make 
the policy more ‘inviting’ to high-skilled and talented migrants. The new government has 
decided to take up the proposal. The Social and Economic Council has reacted by proposing 
some adjustments, and by suggesting an alternative structure of the acknowledged immigrant 
types (SER, 2007). In the following we discuss an aspect that is strongly related to the welfare 
state: the acknowledged types of immigrants and their rights and obligations. Of course the 
proposal of the government and the alternative suggestions of the council include many more 
aspects, like legal aspects and the practical issues on the implementation of policies, but we do 
not discuss them as they are beyond the scope of the study.   
Proposal of the Dutch government 
The government proposal concerns an admission model that comprises of five ‘residence tiers’. 
Admission is granted on the basis of one of these tiers, and each of them contains a uniform 
package of rights and obligations. The five tiers are: (1) exchanges and temporary labour 
migrants, (2) students and labour migrants with professional skills, (3) high-skilled labour 
migrants, (4) family, and (5) humanitarian reasons. Besides the rights and obligations, the 
proposal provides examples on the types of migrants to which a specific tier applies. So the 
proposal does not provide an exhaustive list for all types of migrants. We discuss the first three 
tiers as they consider labour migration and are therefore within the scope of our study.  
 
1.  The first tier deals with the admission of immigrants who want to come to the Netherlands in 
the context of a strictly temporary period of labour (or cultural) exchange. The residence permit 
has a maximum validity of one year and cannot be renewed. An immigrant in the tier who 
wants to be readmitted or wants to extend his stay in another tier will first have to return to his   46 
country of origin and submit a new application from there. The tier will contain, for example, 
seasonal labour migrants, youth exchanges, and au pairs. 
2.  The second tier deals with the admission of immigrants in the context of professionally skilled 
labour (and in the context of study). The labour migrants will be subject to a labour market 
evaluation, which in practice means that the worker needs to have professional skills for which 
there is lack of supply in the Dutch and EU labour market. It is possible for the immigrant to 
switch to another job within the function or residence objective for which the immigrant was 
admitted. The residency permit can be extended, and after a certain time period the permit will 
have an unlimited residency period. When the family members of the immigrant join him/her in 
the Netherlands they will also be admitted in this tier. The tier will contain students and workers 
with specific professional skills, for example, welders. 
3.  The third tier deals with the admission of high-skilled labour migrants. The immigrant can 
move freely in the labour market, provided his/her work remains within the context of the 
relevant functions. The residence permit can be granted for a maximum period of five years, 
and after a certain time period the permit will have an unlimited residency period. When the 
family members of the migrant join him/her in the Netherlands they will also be admitted in this 
tier. The tier will contain migrants that earn a labour income above a certain threshold, and in 
the future it may also contain migrants that qualify for the Dutch labour market by means of a 
point system.  
 
Alternative proposal of Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands 
The Social and Economic Council clearly supports the general goal of redesigning the Dutch 
policy such that it becomes ‘inviting’ to high-skills and talented labour migrants. Nevertheless 
the council proposes an alternative structure for the acknowledged types of labour migrants 
(SER, 2007). Their argument is that the difference between the temporary labour migrants and 
the labour migrants with specific professional skills is unclear in practice. For both employers 
and migrants it may become unclear which tier applies to a certain labour migrant. 
 
The council proposes to have one tier for labour migration by combining the first and second 
tier. The tier will contain two types of permits: (1) permits of at most 24 weeks which can not 
be extended, and (2) permits of at most 3 years which may be extended. As the first and the 
second tier of the government proposal also contain non-labour migration, the council proposes 
to create an additional tier for study and socio-cultural exchange. The high-skilled labour 
migrants remain to have an own tier. So while the proposal of the Dutch government is based 
on the rights and obligations of immigrants, the classification of the council is more based on 
the purpose of stay. 
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6.2  Evaluation on the interaction with the welfare state 
The proposal of the Dutch government is transparent in terms of welfare state sustainability. 
The first residence tier deals with temporary labour migration as it offers work permits with a 
limited duration. The immigrants in this scheme will be low-skilled on average, and they may 
become a net burden for the welfare state in case they would receive a permanent residence 
permit. That is the case, even if a temporary labour migrant is successful in the labour market, 
the low wage and the access to welfare and social security would lead to the same incentive 
problems that low-skilled natives are facing. The limited rights of the immigrants in the tier can 
therefore be justified by the fact that it keeps the risk for welfare state sustainability small.
4 The 
second tier deals with labour migrants with professional skills for which there is lack of supply 
in the labour market. Note that the labour market evaluation in this tier should be sufficiently 
selective in the sense that the skills of the labour migrants should guarantee a prosperous 
employment career. In other words, the labour migrants should reach a participation rate and an 
average wage which is at least around the national average, and preferably even higher. The 
economic potential of such labour migrants is different from the ones in the first tier, in 
particular as the extension of a residency permit can be made dependent on the success of the 
individual migrant. The successful migrants are much more likely to become net contributors to 
the welfare state. So the more extensive rights in this tier are justified by the low risk for the 
sustainability of the welfare state. Labour migrants in the third tier will not face a labour market 
evaluation. This is justified by the fact that they are likely to become net contributors to the 
welfare state anyhow. 
 
The strength of the government proposal is the definition of the rights and obligations in each of 
the tiers. In the first tier it is made clear that the duration of stay is temporary, that the 
immigrant first has to leave the country to request for a new residence permit, and that there is 
no right on family unification. In contrast to this, the second and third tier are more ‘inviting’. 
Family unification is allowed for, and family members do not face labour market restrictions.  
 
The alternative proposal of the Social and Economic Council is less transparent in terms of 
welfare state sustainability, but the council argues that their proposal is more transparent for the 
parties involved, including the employers and the labour migrants. In practice it may sometimes 
be hard to make a clear distinction between temporary labour migrants and labour migrants with 
professional skills for which there is lack of supply in the labour market. So their alternative 
 
4 The first tier however contains a group of labour migrants which are not likely to become a net burden for the welfare state: 
the secondment of employees  (which remains in the employment of a company established outside the Netherlands). 
These migrants have a stable labour relation and will not be low-skilled on average. The limitation of their rights seems a 
somewhat strong policy instrument.   48 
scheme combines labour migrants with and without a prosperous future employment career. In 
their proposal, the labour migrants with a short-term work permit will however have less rights. 
So the rights and obligations will still be related to the duration of the work permit. 
 
One of the conclusions of this study is that a temporary migration policy is only successful if 
the temporary aspect is enforced properly. If not, the policy may end up in an open immigration 
policy and this policy has a negative impact on the welfare state. Therefore the government 
proposal makes a strong point in making a distinction between temporary and non-temporary 
labour migrants. However, the scheme may not work properly if the scheme leads to confusion 
for both employers and migrants. It is an open question whether an alternative structure of the 
acknowledged types of immigrants, which is proposed by the Social and Economic Council of 
the Netherlands, is the right answer to the problem. It is now up to the new government to 
consider all arguments relevant to this issue, and to come up with a revised proposal on the new 
Dutch immigration policy.   49 
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